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2 I. Introduction 
This  report  is  the  follow  up  to  the  first  report'  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament  on  harmonisation  requirements  pursuant  to  Article  25  (1)  of Directive 
96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity2 (hereinafter 
referred to as "electricity directive" or simply "the Directive"). According to Article 25, 
the first report had to be submitted within one year following the entry into force of  the 
Directive on 19 February 1997. At that early stage of  the two year implementation phase 
it was unclear which structural choices several Member States would take in order to 
implement the Directive. Based on the discussions with Member States at the biannual 
meetings of the "Follow-up Group for the implementation of the electricity directive", 
the Commission identified the issue of  promotion of  renewables as the main focus of  the 
first  report  on  harmonisation  requirements.  However,  the  Commission  was  already 
aware that there might be several other areas, which are not specifically addressed by 
the Directive, but nevertheless might require harmonisation or at least which deserve 
regulatory attention to guarantee  the proper and  efficient functioning  of the  internal 
electricity market. 
In  this  light,  the  Commission  proposed  that  there  should  be  not  one  report  on · 
harmonisation requirements, but that at least a second report would be drafted in  t!'>e 
light of experience  after  finalisation  of the  implementation  at  national  level  of the 
Directive. This approach had been supported by the Council. 
It is the objective of this second report to draw the attention of the  Council and the 
European Parliament to a wide range of already existing or expected obstacles within 
the single market of  electricity.  This report is structured in three parts. 
The first part deals with the need to ensure that the implementation of the electricity 
directive does ·not result in  15  liberalised but separate  and  rather isolated electricity 
markets, thereby failing to create one common market. It is the creation of  one common 
market which is expected to produce the ben~fits from synergies, scale economies and 
shared  resources  throughout  the  EU.  Thus,  obstacles  to  the  cross-border  trade  of 
electricity among Member States have to be actively addressed.  This report therefore 
focuses  on  three  issues,  first  the  availability  of transmission  capacity  over  the 
interconnectors between Member States, second, the necessity to establish a system of 
non prohibitive·, but rather trade facilitating, crossborder transmission tarification, and, 
third, the issue of  crossborder exchanges of  electricity with third countries. 
The second part of this report discusses whether there is a need for regulation of the 
electricity netWork  at the European level,  in particular in order to address the cross-
border issues discussed in part one. 
Part three considers the  necessity to ensure a level  playing field  on the  EU  internal 
market for electricity, addressing therefore, stl'Uctural issues that might lead to important 
distortions of the conditions of competition between Member States. To a large extent 
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3 this will be achieved through the application of the competition rules of each Member 
State  and  those  of the  Community.  However,  some  areas  might  create  structural 
distortions, which cannot be tackled by the co~petition rules alone. The present report 
examines three such areas, without prejudice that there might exist an even wider field 
of  problems. The issues covered in this report are environmental standards in electricity 
generation, accounting standards for nuclear decommissioning, and taxation. The main 
issue raised in this respect is whether the different standards in each Member State, 
which  were  acceptable  in  times  of monopolistic  electricity  generation  prior to  the 
electricity directive, have become too heterogeneous in the light of competition after 
liberalisation. 
The issue of the preceding report, namely the promotion schemes for renewable based 
electricity  production,  is  not  further  examined  in  this  report,  as the  discussion that 
followed the report has already led to a series of concrete follow-up actions which. are 
continuing at present. 
This report does not intend to draw final  conclusions on the issues raised. It does not 
claim to be exhaustive in the selection of  questions, nor to cover all aspects of  the issues 
discussed. The questions addressed by this report are so far reaching that the following 
chapters can only draw the attention to the problems and, in some cases, indicate some 
first  lines  of reflection.  Concrete  follow-up  of the  individual  issues  raised  will be 
decided  upon  by  the  Commission  in  the  light  of the  outcome  of the  subsequent 
discussions with the Council and the European Parliament, and comments received from 
interested parties in response to this document. 
II. Obstacles for cross-border trade of  electricity 
Although  the  electricity  directive  does  not  cover  specific  rules  for  cross  border 
transactions, it cannot be concluded that this issue can be solved by relying exclusively 
on national measures. On the contrary, only through joint action at the Community level 
can the problems raised in this area be adequately addressed. It was in the logic of a 
gradual  approach to implementing the internal electricity market that specific  issues 
have to be addressed after the principal  strategic implementation choices have been 
made by the Member States. This is also the raison d'etre for Article 25 of  the Directive, 
on which this report is based. 
The issue of cross-border transmission tarification and other possible-obstacles to free 
and effective trade have already  been the  subject of active preparatory work by the 
Commission. To-date the following actions have been undertaken: 
•  The Commission raised its concern about the functioning of  cross border exchanges 
at the 3rd meeting of  the follow-up up group for the implementation of  the electricity 
directive  on  13/14  May  1998.  In  parallel,  the  Commission  and  the  Council 
presidency created the European Regulation Forum in Florence, which has already 
convened twice,  in February  and  in  October  1998.  At these  meetings,  available 
interconnector capacity and crossborder transmission pricing have been recognised 
4 as key issues, for which an adequate solution is a prerequisite for the functioning of 
a real single market in electricity. It had been agreed to encourage the independent 
transmission  system  operators  (TSOs)  to  coordinate  their  actions  via  a  new 
representative  association of all  independent European TSOs,  and  to  develop  an 
adequate  system  of crossborder  tarification  and  settlement  in  the  light  of the 
development of the competitive internal electricity market.  It was agreed that the 
Commission silpport this process by inviting the independent transmission system 
operators for &; coordination meeting in Brussels, which took place on the 21  January 
1999. 
•  At  that  meeting,  the  TSOs  in  coordination  with  EURELECTRIC,  the  official 
representative of the EU electricity industry including production and distribution, 
presented their commitment to create a European Association of TSOs (ETSOA). It 
is intended that by July 1999 this representative body will be established, first as an 
association of the  already  existing  grid  associations  UCPTE,  NORDEL  and  the 
British and Irish grid systems. 
•  A working group of UCPTE, NORDEL, British NGC  and Irish Grid presented a 
draft paper on their proposals for rules for International exchanges of electricity.  3 
This draft proposal has been submitted to the Energy Consultative Committee for 
discussion,  and has  been forwarded  to  national  governments,  regulators,  and  has 
been made g,enerally available. 
•  Furthermore, the Commission has launched an independent study on cross-border 
electricity transmission tariffs in order to evaluate the different proposals, including 
the a)X>ve  mentioned draft proposal of the TSOs. The final  report is expected for 
May 1999; interim results of  the study have already been taken into account for the 
analysis in this report. 
Evidently, the issue of crossborder electricity trade does not only concern electricity 
exchanges between  Member States,  but also electricity trade  with third countries.  A 
harmonised  approach  to  access  rules  for  electricity  from  third  countries  is  of key 
importance in the light of  the common commercial policy and the related international 
obligations of  the EU. The issue deserves careful and urgent clarification, as important 
non-EU  potential  electricity  exporters  and  transit  countries  are  aire8dy  engaged  in 
electricity  commerce  with  the  EU  and  may,  in  due  course,  request  full  and  non-
discriminatory market access including the right to directly supply eligible customers 
through network access, introduced by the electricity directive. 
1. Available interc:onneetor capacity 
1.1. Introduction 
3 draft "International Exchanges of  Electricity - Rules proposed by the European Transmission System 
Operators", 14.1.1999 
5 Interconnectors  are  the  bridges  between  the  national  or,  in  some  cases,  regional 
electricity systems. They are of critical importance for the single electricity market, as 
the  capacity  of these  interconnectors  will  often  not  be  sufficient  (or  the  expected 
increasing  power trade after liberalisation.  Thus,  interconnectors tend to  be  in many 
cases  bottlenecks  of the  European  transmission  system.  Moreover,  in  contrast  to 
"normal"  bottlenecks  within  the  territory  of one  TSO,  interconnectors  involve  by 
definition two TSOs.  In order to ensure an  economically  optimal usage of available 
capacity, as well as fair and non-discriminatory access for all system users, a new level 
of coordination between the TSOs needs to be established. In the past, trade over these 
interconnectors has only taken place between mostly vertically integrated TSOs for their 
. own  commercial  interest.  Trade  was  either  used  as  a  guarantee. mechanism  for  the 
purposes of  reserve, e.g. within the continental European UCPTE system, or was based 
on long term power purchase contracts between the vertically integrated TSOs.  After 
entry into full application of  the electricity Directive in 19 February 1999, TSOs have to 
be managed as independent entities, unbundled at least in management terms from any 
commercial interests in generation, trade or supply of electricity. Thus, reservation of 
capacity for long-term contracts will compete with short-term needs for the transactions 
of eligible customers and traders. In the absence of sufficient interconnector capacity 
and if the allocation rules are not harmonised, or at least to a high degree compatible, 
consumers will be confronted with higher costs and more refusals of network access 
then would be justified by the real physical constraints. The electricity directive does 
not set specific rules, neither for the management of  scarce interconnection capacity nor 
for  the  development  of new  interconnection  lines.  Thus, ·this  chapter  contemplates 
whether  there  is  the  need  for  further  harmonisation  requirements  to  address  the 
following set of  questions: 
1.2. The management of  existing interconnection capacity: 
How can available transmission capacity (ATC)  be maximised in the short run? 
What  are  fair  and  non-discriminatory  rules  for  allocating  scarce  transmission 
capacity? 
How  should TSOs  deal with long term  capacity reservations arising from  long term 
power purchase  contracts,  in particular those  concluded by themselves prior to  the 
entry into force of  the Directive? 
1.3. Encouraging the construction of  new interconnection capacity. 
How  can  it be  ensured that the  system  creates  sufficient  incentive for  building new 
interconnection  lines  in  the  light  of the  increased  needs  of the  single  marlcet for 
electricity? 
How  can  it be  ensured that economically correct price signals for the  use of  scarce 
interconnection capacity are given to system users? 
These questions are e~amined in sections 1.2 - 1.3 below. Conclusions drawn from this 
examination are contained in section 1.4. 
6 1.2. The management of  existing crou-border interconneetor capacity 
The electricity directive states in Article 8(1 ): The transmission system operator shall be 
·responsible for dispatching the generating installations in its area and for determining 
the use of  interconnectors with other systems. 
In the light of this basic responsibility, it is  expected that the TSO will  assume the 
folloWing tasks and  operating principles: 
1.2.1. Maximising avallable transmission capaeity 
Pursuant to Articles 17(5) and 18(4) of the Directive, requests for network access may 
only be refused on grounds of lack of  transmission or distribution capacity (apart from 
clearly defined situations relating to public service obligations or reciprocity).  It has 
always been understood that "lack of  capacity" in this respect refers to lack of  physical 
capacity.  Unjustified  contractual  blocking4  or insufficient  capacity  due  to  a  lack  of 
coordination efforts between neighbouring TSOs do not, in principle, justify refusal of 
access. In other words, a duty exists on the TSO to ensure that interconnections are used 
in the most efficient possible manner. 
One of  the most effective ways to maximise available transmission capacity is to "off-
set" counterdirecied transmission requestss.  To this effect, TSOs must cooperate in a 
way to  superimpose counterdirected transmission requests.  Only the resultant overall 
physical flow can cause congestion and a possible refusal of  access. Thus, by deduction, 
any transmission constraint can only exist for transmission in the congested direction, as 
counterdirected flows over the same bottleneck free up capacity and reduce transmission 
losses.  This consideration is examined in detail  below in chapter 2.5.  with regard to 
congestion pricing. 
Whereas coordination in form of simple superposition of counterdirected flows should 
not produce  any  significant additional  costs,  remaining  bottlenecks  could  further  be 
freed up through coordinated redispatching, countertrading or market splitting {in case 
of  sP<>t  markets)6  by  the  TSO,  however,  thereby  producing  additional  costs. 
Nonetheless, as TsOs should be able and entitled to pass on these costs to the network 
users, economic theory and existing practice, e.g. in Scandinavia, suggest that the-TSOs 
should  engage  in  such redispatching  or countertrading  measures,  thereby  increasing 
overall synergies of  the common market. 
1.2.2. Fair and non discriminatory allocation ofscaree transmission capacity 
Article  8(2)  of the  Directive  states  that  "...  the  use  of interconnectors  shall  be 
determined on the basis of  criteria which may be approved by the Member State and 
4 see below 1.2.3. 
s see annex for dcfmition. 
6 see annex for definitions. 
7 which must be objective, published and applied in a non-discriminatory manner which 
ensures the proper  functioning of  the internal market in electricity." 
It has been outlined above that a system could and should be set up, comparable to the 
Scandinavian practice, which avoids curtailing or refusing single transaCtion requests 
through  measures  taken  by  TSOs,  such  as  redispatching  of  generation  plants, 
countertrading, or market splitting on either side of  a bottleneck. 
However, it must be acknowledged that such a system might not be realised in the very 
near  future  and  that  even  then,  some  severe  bottlenecks  (often  referred  to  as 
"flowgates") may persist due to net flow in one direction exceeding the capacity of the 
interconnector in question. This would make it necessary to limit or refuse transmission 
requests until additional interconnections capacity could be constructed. 
In such cases several approaches to rationing limited capacity can be distinguished: 
- first come first serve: if  capacity limit is reached no more requests are accepted; 
- pro rata rationing: all requested transactions are carried out but each transaction 
quantity is cut by the same percentage; 
-merit order: based on giving up confidentiality, the cheapest kWh transactions are 
prioritised; 
- renewable priority: transactions originating from a renewable based electricity 
source are given priority; 
-bidding or auctioning for scarce capacity. 
Within the scope of this report it is not intended to analyse and evaluate each of  these 
mechanisms  according  to  criteria  such  as  non-discrimination,  efficiency  and  trade 
encouragement.  It is,  however,  easy  perceivable that a  substantial  obstacle to trade 
would exist, when at a given interconnector Member State A applied "first come first 
serve"  whereas  Member  State  B  applied  e.g.  "pro  rata  rationing  with  renewable 
priority". Thus, a minimum of coordination or harmonisation among the TSOs of the 
different Member States is crucial. It appears clear case that some fonn of Community 
action may be necessary to ensure a satisfactory solution of  this cross-border problem. 
1.2.3. Long term reservation oftrans.-aission capacity 
A particular problem in the context of  allocation of  transmission capacity is the issue of 
long  tenn  reservation  of transmission  capacity.  Long  term  reservations  have  the 
potential  to  exclude  other market  participants  from  using  interconnectors  for  their 
imports of  electricity. The problem becomes even more sensitive if  the TSO is part of  a 
vertically integrated company which itself benefits from a long term electricity purchase 
or selling contract for which it claims the necessity of  long term capacity reservation. 
8 ( 1) The evaluation of  capacity reservation agreements 
The  starting  point of any  such  analysis  is  the  question  whether  there  is  a  need  to 
combine  firm  electricity  supply  or  purchase  contracts  with  a  reservation  of 
corresponding transmission capacity.  Indeed,  it could be argued that such a capacity 
reservation is not necessary to ensure that the parties of  an electricity purchase contract 
can  at  any  time  fulfil  their  contractual  obligations.  In  the  event  of insufficient 
transmission capacity, the seller could, for example, simply buy the quantities that it can 
not transmit over the bottleneck at the market on the customer's side of the bottleneck. 
The additional costs incurred by such a measure would theoretically be the same as if 
the TSO would auction the interconnector capacity. 
Moreover,  with  regard  to  the  overall  volume,  the  transmission  market  is  clearly 
subordinated to the generation market. Transmission has, thus, a supportive or arbitrage 
function in order to contribute to the optimisation of  the generation market. The TSOs 
which are, usually, at the same time responsible for dispatching of generation and for 
allocating transmission capacity, are  in the best position to optimise the transmission 
market as a function of  the optimisation in the generation market. In order to provide for 
a m&Ximum of  flexibility, reservation of  transmission capacity should be avoided as far 
as possible. In particular at the current stage of  early development of  a European market 
for electricity it appears premature to permit speculation with irrevocable transmission 
rights.  This could undermine the coordination role of the  TSO,  and could create the 
blockage of significant transmission capacity. Market players could purchase capacities 
at strategic bottlenecks and withhold and thus  block this capacity, e.g.  to bid up  the 
value of  the transmission right, or simply to prevent competitors or new market entrants 
from using the line. 
Agreements between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and 
which have as their object or effect to prevent, restrict or distort competition within the 
common market are prohibited under Article 85  EC Treaty. Furthermore, any abuse by 
an undertaking of a dominant position in a substantial part of the common mark.et  is 
prohibited under Article 86 EC Treaty. 
The Commission will enforce these provisions where necessary in order to  warrant a 
smooth functioning of the internal market in electricity. It will examine the contracts 
governing the use of  interconnectors with a view to evaluate to what extent these restrict 
competition within the meaning of Articles 85  or 86. In doing so the Commission will 
apply the general principles for the assessment of  vertical restrains of  competition. 
The following parameters will be important for the analysis of the transmission market 
in question: 
- the  share  of the  contracted  capacity  in  relation  to  the  relevant  overall  available 
interconnector capacity for electricity imports 
- the  extent  to  which  the  capacity  of the  relevant  interconnectors  is  reserved  for 
exclusive use by one or several parties 
9 - the extent to which the capacity is reserved long-term 
- the duration of  any such reservation 
- whether there exists congestion 
- the procedure adopted by the owner of  the capacity when attributing it 
- the  impact of a  capacity  constraint on  the  supply  markets  connected  by  the  link. 
Particular  attention  will  be  paid,  for  example,  to  cases  where  an  interconnector 
constitutes  the  sole  available transmission opportunity towards any  given market on 
which competition is already limited (for exap1ple,  mark~ts with a monopolistic supply 
structure). 
The  fact  that  the  Commission  intends  to  carry  out  an  assessment  of the  contracts 
governing  the  use  of interconnectors  does,  of course,  not  mean  that  all  capacity 
reservation agreements restricting competition are  illegal.  Indeed, the  Commission is 
fully aware of the fact that the conclusion of capacity reservation agreements may be 
indispensable for example in order to make the construction of  a new interconnector at 
all feasible. 
The Commission will for the time being assess contracts on a case-by-case basis and 
take adequate measures in order to fulfil the objectives of the Treaty and the Directive. 
These measures will help provide guidance to the operators as to the compatibility of 
capacity reservation agreements with the rules applicable. 
(2) Potential solutions 
It is not the intention of the Commission'to set out already now precise guidelines as to 
capacity reservation agreements. 
However, experience in other countries and in other markets has shown that there exist 
several options which could lead to a better "liquidity" of  the transmission market than 
the current transaction-based approach. 
In this respect it appears appropriate to underline the difficulty of accepting capacity 
reservation more restrictive than in terms of"priority rights". This is also referred to as a 
"use  it  or  loose  it"  rule  for  capacity  reservations  or  simply  as  a  prohibition  for 
withholding capacity. In practise the holder of such a long-term priority reservation has 
to notify, e.g. 24 hours in advance, whether it will use the reserved capacity. Thus, the 
capacity portion which it does not use increases the short-term available transmission 
capaci~y for spotmarket transactions of other network users. Such a rule is practised in 
the  Scandinavian  Nordpool.  This  approach  is  also  shared  by  most  of the  OECD 
regulators, such those of  the US or Australia. 
It appears appropriate that any such priority reservations should become transparent for 
regulators and in an adequate form, taking account of  confidential business data, also· for 
the remaining market participants, in order to  improve their knowledge about critical 
10 bottlenecks.  Such  reservation  data,  aggJ;egated  in  categories  according  to  different 
terms,  including  short-term  indication ·'of unused  reservation,  should  be  listed  in  a 
transparent  register,  accessible  to  all  market  participants,  using  appropriate  online 
technologies. 
On the basis of  such a register or matrix, any eligible consumer, supplier or trader could 
receive information whether a transaction from  TSO X to any other TSO might face a 
constraint and therefore pOtentially create additional costs. 
In the US, an Internet based "open access same time information system" (OASIS) has 
been established. It constantly publishes the available transmission capacities and, thus, 
allows  for  a  transparent  and  non-discriminatory  approach  to  capacity  reservation, 
allocation and pricing for strategic interconnector bottlenecks. 
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1.3. Eneouraging the constrodion of  new intereonnedion eapacity 
The importance which the Commission attaches to the further development of strategic 
electricity interconnectors is based on the identification of such interconnector projects 
in the  light of the objectives of the EU  transeuropean network policy,  established  in 
Article  129b-d  of the  Treaty.  Article  129b mentions as explicit  objectives,  amongst 
others, the promotion of an open, competitive market, the  interoperability of national 
networks and the principle of  network access. 
Article  2.10  of the  electricity  directive  defines  that  "'interconnectors'  shall  mean 
equipment used to link electricity systems". For the following point it is, however, useful 
to  distinguish between (l) interconnectors which are pure connection points between 
two  existing neighbouring systems, and  (2)  interconnectors which represent a proper 
physical line, e.g.  submarine cables, and  which are often constructed and financed  as 
separate  projects  or joint ventures.  Most of the  reflections  of this  chapter  apply  to 
11 investment  intensive  interconnector  projects,  thus  dealing  with  interconnectors  that 
represent a significant physical cable in itself. 
1.3.1. Respecting unbundling 
Because of the  existence of monopolistic  supply  areas  until  recent  years,  the  often 
vertically  integrated  electricity  companies  had  only  limited  interest  in  building 
significant interconnection lines.  If,  nevertheless,  important line  projects were built, 
they were often connected to long term electricity supply contracts. 
Article 7(6) of  the Directive introduces the unbundling of  management by requiring the 
TSO  to  be  independent  at  least  in  management  terms,  from  other  activities  of a 
vertically integrated electricity undertaking, such as generation and distribution. Article 
7(5) requires that the  TSO may not  "discriminate between system users or classes of 
system users, particularly in favour of  its subsidiaries or shareholders." Article 14 of 
the  Directive  introduces  the  requirement  to  separate  the  accounts  according  to 
generation, transmission, distribution and other activities. 
Therefore, the  light of these unbundling obligations, one has to strictly  differentiate 
whether an interconnector, and indeed any other transmission line is built in the interest 
and on the account of the independent TSO or in the interest and on the account of a 
producer or distributor. It could probably infringe Article 7(5) and 7(6) of  the Directive, 
if  the independent TSO built an interconnector line in order to realize the benefits from 
a potential electricity supply opportunity. 
Thus, there might be concern that either a TSO in such circumstances would not act 
independently and favour commercial interests of its vertically integrated activities or, 
otherwise, that not enough capital will be found to invest in important interconnector 
capacity of benefit to competitors of the vertically integrated company. The concern 
does not appear justified, as the Directive does not undermine the possibility for any line. 
constructor or operator to recover the  full  costs of its  investment through adequate 
transmission fees.  However, the investment decision to construct a new interconnector 
may, in an "unbundled world", either originate in the transmission service interest of  the 
TSO  itself,  thereby  amortising  the  line  purely  through transmission  fees,  or in the 
electricity trade interest of a producer or distributor, thereby at least partly amortising 
the line through trade margins. Thus, if  a vertically integrated company at the same time 
constructs an interconnector line and pursues a commercial interest via selling or buying 
electricity over this line, particular regulatory attention has to be dedicated to the correct 
unbundling of  accounts, i.e. the correct distribution of  investment costs to revenue from 
electricity trading and to revenue from transmission fees. 
1.3.2. Direct lines 
Under the rules of  the electricity directive it is not just possible that new interconnectors 
are built as part of  the TSO system, but also as ditect line according to Article 21. This 
raises concerns about the coordination with the TSO system, in particular with regard to 
non-discriminatory access. 
12 Necessarily, one has to differentiate between two types of  direct lines. First, those in the 
IUUTOW  sense  of Article  21,  namely  those  connecting  producers  or  suppliers  with 
subsidiaries or eligible customers. Typically such a line would only have one connection 
point to  the interconnected  system,  the  second end point being  a  power plant or a 
consumer.' In that case third parties cannot use the line for other purposes than direct 
supply  contracts  with  the  direct  line  owner.  In  these  cases  network  access  and 
remuneration questions are not of  general interest. 
Second, however, one could imagine that an interconnector project, connecting two 
TSO systems, could be legally structured as a direct line. For example, the generating or 
sales parts of  a vertically integrated company might build a direct line to a distribution 
company within another TSO area. The distributor may be  a subsidiary of  the vertically 
integrated company-being the pmchaser in the sense of  Article 21 of  the Directive, and 
having, therefore, the right to build a direct line.  In that case, the direct line would, 
indeed  be  an interconnector,  being  itself connected  at  both  ends  to  interconnected 
systems. Such a line can ~tentially be used by third parties. As the Directive does not 
provide for  any  exception from  the obligation to  grant access to  the interconnected 
netwOrk, non-di~riminatory access to third parties has to be given. Equally, the rules of 
Article 14 of the Directive concerning the unbundling of accounts would have to be 
respected  by  a  vertically  integrated  company,  engaging  in  such  an  interconnection 
construction.  Even  if the  construction  interest  originated  in  the  production  or 
distribution  act!-vity,  it would  appear  logical  to  attribute  the  interconnector  to  the 
transmission activity. 
1.4. Conclusion  . 
From the above analysis the following preliminary conclusions can be drawn: 
- Transparency  of available  transmission  capacity  between  the  TSOs  is  of key 
importance. To provide all market participants with the data they need to plan their 
transactions and to avoid discrimination, an information system· should be established 
by the European TSOs. 
-For the short term allocation of bottlenecks, rationing or auctioning mechanisms are 
envisagable, with a clearly identified need to harmonise the allocation rule, -on  both 
sides of  each interconnector. 
- Long term reservation of transmission capacity should be regulated and restricted to 
the  right of priority  use  of the  line  with the  obligation to  make  unused  capacity 
available to the short term market. 
- In  order  to  encourage  the  construction  of  new  interconnector  lines,  or  the 
reinforcement of transit  lines,  it could  be  necessary  to  provide  for  timely  limited 
exceptions from the general rules under case by case regulatory control. This could 
7  It is also possible that an eligible customer, which is already connected to a supplier, builds a second 
line to another supplier as a direct line. In such a case access for a third party could be imaginable. 
13 allow for ship or pay contracts or for specific toll-routes, comparable to the highway 
system. This being said, it must be maintained that any new line, irrespective whether 
constructed as part of  the TSO's system or as direct line according to Article 21 of  the 
Directive,  is  fully  subject  to  the  principle  of third  party  access,  as soon  as  it  is 
connected to the interconnected system. 
A two level approach can be.considered in order to implement these conclusions: 
( 1)  Issues such as discriminatory allocation of interconnector capacity as well as long 
term  capacity  reservation  over  interconnectors  will  have  to  be  addressed  by  the 
Commission  pursuant  to  the  competition rules  in close  collaboration  with  national 
regulators to  on a case  by  case  basis.  If necessary,  supportive published guidelines 
might be developed. 
(2) A more formal  approach, which could cover redispatching and flow superposition 
rules for crossborder exchanges as well as the publication and transparency rules for 
available interconnector capacity might be envisaged through amendments of the price 
transparency  directive  90/377/EEC  and  the  transit  directive  90/547/EEC.  The  price 
transparency directive could include the transparency requirements concerning available 
transmission capacity as  well as transmission fees  (see next chapter). Concerning the 
allocation  rules  for  interconnection  capacity,  including  priority  rules  and  regulatory 
control  of exceptions,  an  amendment  of the  transit  directive  could  be  the  adequate 
platform. Alternatively, as both the price transparency and the transit directive became 
in some respects obsolete after the adoption of the electricity directive 92/96/EC, they 
could both be replaced with one new directive concerning open access rules. 
At  present,  the  Commission has  reached  no  concrete  conclusions  on  these  possible 
approaches.  This  will  be  determined  in the  light  of the  comments  received  on this 
report, notably from the Council and the European Parliament. 
2. Cross-border  tarifi~ation and settlement 
2.1. Introduction 
Although  the  implementation  phase  of the  electricity  directive  has  expired  on  19 
February  1999,  and  whilst  most  Member  Statess  have,  indeed,  implemented  the 
directive, and although transmission capacity is physically available, for most eligible 
customers it is in fact organisationally and economically difficult to choose a supplier 
situated in another Member State, i.n particular if  a third or forth Member State has to be 
transited.  The  reason  for  this is simple:  there  is  no  tariff framework  for crossborder 
transactions.  Each  transaction  has  to  be  negotiated,  and  each  concerned  TSO  will 
require a transmission fee,  which is  not necessarily coordinated with the transmission 
fees already payable to other TSO. Thus, the sum of  all required transmission fees will 
8 According to Article 27(2) Ireland and Belgium have been granted a one year, Greece a two year 
supplementary period for implementation. (see brochure) 
14 in most cases add up to a prohibitive amount, making it cheaper for the customer to 
stick with ~e  local supplier. This is referred to as full or partial "pancaking". 
It has to  be recalled, at this point, that the physical flows of electricity do not follow 
contractual flows, particularly in the highly meshed network of  continental Europe. It is, 
thus,  an organisational  challenge  to  create,  on the  one  hand,  a  simple  crossborder 
tarification system which encourages eligible customers to take advantage of  the single 
market, complemented, on the other hand, with a settlement or clearing system among 
the TSOs, which allows them to redistribute the tariff revenues according to physically 
metered flows and according to complex intra TSO rules which do not have to concern 
the customers. Certainly, such a degree of  coordination requires TSOs to be independent 
of the interests of production and commercial trading activities. It requires appropriate 
structures and commonly accepted rules. 
At the current state of  discussion, the key issues to be solved are: 
- to reach an understandmg which costs may be recovered in the access fees, 
- to reach a conclusion with respect to nodal pricing vs. transaction related pricing, 
- to agree on a pricing policy that does not involve "pancaking", 
- to agree on a  pricing policy for congestion. 
2.2. Cost reflectiveness and other general pricing principles 
' 
(1) To promote the benefits of  the single electricity market, network access fees should 
be transparent, simple, based rather on variable kWh than on fixed capacity payments9 
and as far as possible non-transaction based, in order to be compatible with spot-market 
and trading activities. 
(2) Moreover, and most importantly, they should b.e  globally cost reflective as TSOs -
have  a  natural  monopoly.  The  commonly  recognised  conflict  between  the  first 
mentioned principles leading to a  simple and transparent approach, and the objective of 
cost reflectiveness, can be solved with a two level approach. On a first level, the-overall 
cost base can be translated  into  simplified,  ex ante  defined,  postage  stamp oriented 
tariffs, established under regulatory control. On a second level, physical flow related, ex 
post measured and thus most possible cost reflective settlement can take place between 
the TSOs in order to compensate inaccuracies and a possibly unfair revenue distribution 
arising  from  the  simplified ex ante tariffs  co11ected  from  customers and  generators. 
Clearly, such an approach needs regular feedback and flexible adaptation of  the ex-ante 
tariffs according to the deviations measured in the settlement exercise. 
9  Perhaps, however, subject to the possibility of  fixed capacity payments on a short-term basis. 
15 (3) The cost base for the global amount of  collected transmission fees of  any TSO must 
be derived exclusively and in a verifiable manner from the accounts of  the transmission 
activity, properly unbundled according to Article 14 of  the Directive. 
(  4) Stranded costs relating to Article 24 of the Directive and costs of domestic public 
service  obligations  may  only  be  charged to  domestic  consumers.  The  cost  base  for 
crossborder elements of transmission  fees  should  exclude  stranded  costs or costs of 
ancillary  services  or  public  service  obligations  that  are  not  directly  related  to  the 
transmission service itself. Such costs should be invoiced as a transparent and separate 
item and may not affect transiting transmissions.IO 
(5) Transmission fees have to be determined ex ante, based on transparent assumptions 
concerning transmission quantities.  Actual  revenue  from  transmission equals ex-ante 
determined transmission fees multiplied by actually executed transmission quantities for 
any  transaction  based  tariff elements.  If,  due  to  higher  than  estimated  transmission 
quantities, the annual revenue exceeds the unbundled costs of  the transmission activity, 
the transmission fees have to be adjusted. 
Under regulatory control, a certain share of such a surplus could be left as profit to the 
TSO  in  order  to  give  an  incentive  to  manage  higher  transmission  amounts  than 
originally planned. 
2.3. Non transaction based pricing versus transaction based pricing 
Any charges on cross-border transmission must, as discUssed above, be globally related 
to  cost. As mentioned above, physical flows not only do  not follow contract paths, in 
fact they bear little relation to distance in jill highly meshed network', which according to 
economic models and studies should rather be compared with a common lake to which 
some  add  water and  others take  out water.  It is  irrelevant  in  terms  of cost  in  such 
circumstances, whether the one who takes water from  the lake (or electricity grid) is 
situated close to the one who puts water (or electricity) in, or is situated on the other 
side  of the  lake  (or electricity  grid).  Thus,  in  order to  calculate  the  transit  cost  of 
electricity, it is  not possible to  base calculations on contract flows,  but on the actual 
costs incurred in carrying out the resultant physical flow. 
Based on this generally low correlation between contract path and physical flow,  the 
concept  of non-transaction  related  (also  "nodal  tarification"  or  "connection  point 
tarification")  is  increasingly  being  developed  in  contrast  to  transaction  oriented 
approaches and is becoming increasingly accepted as an industry standard. 
Transaction  based  tariffs  require  the  network  users  to  notify  feed  in  point  and 
consumption point for  each concluded transaction.  The transmission fee  can then  be 
calculated for each individual transaction according to distance oriented or contract path 
models.  Non  transaction  based,  or  nodal  tariff systems  recover  the  network  costs 
exclusively  through connection or access charges for  consumers and  producers.  The 
10 In  ~ormal circumstances, such changes should be levied only at one level, eg final customers 
16 access fee  does not change with the change of contract partner.  Thus, the access fee 
gives an individual network user the right to buy or sell electricity to or from any other 
user within the system.  This reflects the above picture of the  lake,  where  the  access 
price does not depend on the location from where water is being taken. 
Non  transaction  based,  nodal  tariff systems,  have  clear  advantages  with  respect  to 
simplicity  and  easy  for  customers  to  change  their  supplier.  Any  gain  of  cost 
reflectiveness from transaction related systems is in reality questionable as shown by the 
above  reflections.  Furthermore,  the  disadvantage  of transaction  based  systems  lies 
clearly in the difficulty to combine such a system with power exchanges and spotmarket 
based systems. 
A combination of a  generally non-transaction based system with  certain transaction-
based passages could be imaginable for  exceptional cases, if these transaction based 
passages are congested "flowgates" (see below 2.5) and if the additional information 
requested by the transaction based passage is limited to the minimum necessary. 
lo4o Transit pricing without "pancaking" 
At the meeting of  the Regulators in Florence in October 1998, a price formula has been 
presented which aimed at avoiding the problem of  cumulating national transmission fees 
when transmitting over several TSO areas ("pancaking"). 
Total transaction cost T =  atTt + a:zT:z +  ooo + anT n 
Tt to Tn represent the full postage stamp tariff for one TSO, representing the full cost of 
the national transmission network. The coefficients a1  to  an  are  weighing coefficients, 
which take into account that in a crpssborder transmission each TSO should only be 
allowed to charge for part of its total system costs in order to avoid pancaking. This is 
because even if electricity contractually (rather than physically) passes between two, 
three, or four networks, the real costs of  transit bear no relation to the total transmission 
tariffs of  all TSOs. The analogy of  the lake is relevant in this respect. 
Thus if the sum ofthe weighting coefficients at, 82, to an were not allowed to be higher 
than 1, pancaking would be effectively avoided. However, full  cost covering could not 
be guaranteed to TSO unless they effectively calculate compensation payments amongst 
each other to ensure that each TSO receives the appropriate part ofoverall tariff. 
In January 1999, the European TSOs presented a proposal which modified the formula, 
insofar, as 
Total transaction cost T =  Gt + (Ttkt +  000 + T nkn) + Ln 
Gt  would represent the share of  the total TSO 1 costs charged by TSO 1 to the generator 
(source of  the transaction) in its area, e.g. through a connection fee or postage stamp. Ln 
represents the respective partial fee for the consumer in the area of TSOn. The bracket 
17 tenn indicates partial transit elements T11, weighted with a coefficient k if more than 
one TSO is concerned with physical transit flows. 
The capping condition has been altered as it stipulates that each TSO must separate its 
total transmission fee in a generator connection element G, a consumer load connection 
element L and a transit element T, whereas the sum of G+  T  +L must not be higher that 
the total TSO costs. 
Clearly, this approach leads to full cost recovery for each TSO. However, if  this formula 
were directly applied towards the customers, it would lead to a "shallow pancaking", as 
the total fee will increase with each additional transit element T. 
The presented approach leaves, however, three possibilities for application: 
(1)  to  apply  the  formula  to  each  individual  transaction,  based  on  individual  flow 
simulations for assessing the transit elements; 
(2)  to apply the formula globally but still directly to customers, determining ex ante a 
fixed  global  postage  stamp  for  the transit elements,  settling  ex post differences 
between TSOs; 
(3)  to apply the formula only for the inter TSO settlement, charging only connection 
fees  to  the  customers  (which  may  be  higher  because  these  connection  charges 
include the inter TSO compensation payments to the transit networks). 
Ad 1) The first option is clearly transaction oriented. Without ex ante available postage 
stamp tariffs for transit area, it is  difficult for consumers to  compare different offers 
from  different  suppliers.  Thus  it  would  not  contribute  to  market  transparency  and 
discrimination  would  be  difficult  to  control.  It might  significantly  encumber  the 
development of spot  markets,  which require  the  maximum  possible  non-transaction 
oriented approach 
Ad 2) The focus of  the discussion should be centred between the options 2 and 3. From 
the customers point of view any transit element, thus also case 2, represents at least a 
"shallow pancaking" as it results in a higher price for a transaction which passes over 
transit networks compared to a transaction of  equal distance and network loss generation 
which would be situated in one TSO area only. 
The  question,  therefore,  is  in  which  cases  it  could  be  economically  and  politically 
preferable not to rely on inter TSO compensation for transits but on direct recovery from 
network users, thereby jeopardising the nodal pricing approach with transaction based 
elements.  This question must be answered from a cost perspective as well as from  a 
European pricing policy perspective. 
From a cost perspective, some argue that even if no physical transit flows result from 
cross-border contractual  flows,  there  are  costs of coordination  and  administrationi2. 
II Including T clements in areas of  the generator and customer. 
18 Furthermore, if an overall physical transit flow results, the transited network has a right 
to  charge  a  part  of its  network  costs  to  transits  and  so  to  finance  a  part  of the 
infrastructure cost burden from their local network users. Thus, it is arguable that such 
transit elements should be charged directly to the customer as they reflect the actual cost 
distribution between TSO. 
From a price policy perspective, any additional transit fee is comparable with a distance 
related pricing approach, which, according to model simulations, can hardly be justified, 
at least not for small and medium sized transactions. Option 2, thus, does not follow the 
above  quoted  idea of the common  lake.  Only,  if the  transited  network  is  congested 
because  of the  transiting  transactions,  a  price  signal,  direction  sensitive,  makes 
economic sense. This is further discussed in the next chapter  . 
• 
Ad 3) Thus, whereas it is fully recognised that transited networks are entitled to receive 
cost  recovery  from  tr_ansits,  there  are  strong  grounds  to  argue  that  this  should  be 
accomplished at  the level  of inter TSO  compensation payments.  Only  if the  transits 
contribute to  congestion or if the  transits should  openly pay  for  the  construction of 
transit or interconnector lines (see  1.3.2.) an ex ante determined global transit postage 
stamp, possibly direction oriented, may be justified. 
Any such ex ante calculation of  the proportion of  this transit postage stamp in relation to 
the domestic "connection stamps" must be based on transparent, objective and verifiable 
criteria, e.g.  net physical transit flows  in relation to  locally connected generation and 
consumption capacity  . 
.2.5. Congestion pricing 
Pricing for ·congestion is closely related to the allocation rules for available transmission 
capacity.  The  fundamental  question  is  whether  to  refuse  access  and  thus  to  curtail 
transmission if  the physical capacity limit is reached or whether to establish a bidding or 
pricing system for situations where transmission capacity becomes scarce. The refusal 
of access approach has the  disadvantage that it requires the  identification of specific 
transactions  and  that  it  might  not  be  the  least  discriminatory  way  to  allocate  the 
capacity. 
If it is  sought to  avoid refusal of access,  redispatching,  countertrading or auctioning 
mechanisms will  create specific  costs reflecting the  differential  cost of electricity on 
either side of the co11gestion.  In theory all mechanisms should produce the same cost 
result. 
The exact costs can only be charged ex post based on the measured costs of  countertrade 
or redispatch or outcome of  auctionings. However, ex ante predictions of  these costs on 
the  basis  of the  published  ATC  information  should  be  provided  for.  As  a  general 
principle, the consumer should always have the choice between paying these extra costs 
of  congestion resolution or rather accepting a refusal of  the transmission. 
12  Which are, however, low compared to total network costs. 
19 Experience from the Nordpool suggests that the costs of congestion resolution do not 
even reach 1%1 3 of the total transmission costs (infrastructure costs).  Thus, the actual 
cost impact of  the system chosen is limited and emphasis should be put on a simple and 
trade encouraging approach. 
Consequently,  in  general,  it  does  not  appear  sensible  to  permit  ex  ante  congestion 
avoiding  price  signals  which  would  break  the  principle  of cost  reflective  and  cost 
capped  transmission  fees.  This  would  complicate  the  administrative  and  regulatory 
control and possible interfere with subsidiarity regarding national approaches to price 
regulation. 
However, for specific severe predominantly one directional bottlenecks, a  tran~parent 
and non-discriminatory ex ante congestion fee could be acceptable in order to avoid the 
curtailing of transactions. Logically, counterdirected transactions, which open up new 
capacity  and  reduce  transmission  losses  should  receive  a  price  incentive,  e.g.  a 
reimbursement for avoided costs. Any overall proceeds from such fees (or auctionings) 
must be separated from the TSO cost recovery and put into a ring-fenced fund, Which is, 
e.g. earmarked for construction of  interconnection reinforcements14. 
For  the  financing  of specific  interconnector  projects,  such  as  submarine  cables  or 
specific  transit  cables,  a  separate  transaction  oriented  "toll"  could  be  acceptable 
(comparable to specific road traffic passages such as tunnels or bridges). 
Clearly,  the  analysis  shows  that  there  are  several  reasonable  approaches  to  the 
congestion problem. It is exactly this variety of choices, which makes harmonisation or 
coordination  indispensable.  Both TSOs on either side  of a  congested  interconnector 
need  to  apply  compatible  approaches.  Otherwise  many  transactions  could  be 
unnecessarily be refused, not on grounds of lack of  capacity but· simply caused by poor 
coordination. 
2.6. Conclusions 
It is important to reH:ch  a rapid solution for the problem of cross border tarification as 
this seems to remain the major obstacle for exchanges within the  internal  market in 
electricity. Particular harmonisation requirements have been identified with regard to an 
agreement on the transit element as well as on congestion pricing for severe bottlenecks 
or "flowgates". The reflections suggested that a non transaction-based nodal tarification 
system, which relies to a maximum on inter TSO compensation and settlement in order 
to  facilitate  trade  between  eligible  customers,  producers,  suppliers  and  traders, 
providing therefore  for  a  tariff level  applicable  to  customers  and  a  settlement  level 
allowing for clearing among TSOs, would have several advantages: 
13  However, a figure ofO.I% is more typical, e.g. in Sweden. 
14  However, this needs to be examined carefully, as their transaction-based congestion management is a 
partial contradiction to the nodal point approach .explained above. 
20 •  it recognises  the difference  between contractual  flows  and  physical  flows,  taking 
account of  superposition and loop flows effects; 
•  it recognises the customers • need for simple and non transaction based tariffs which 
is opposed to the TSOs' need for exact arid cost reflective remuneration, 
•  it gives  customers  ex  ante  tariffs for  single transmissions  and,  at  the  same  time, 
allows TSOs to settle ex post for the resultant sum of  overlapping transmissions. 
In the light of  the discussions following this report, it is hoped to find a common view 
amongst EU regulators  and governments as to  the most appropriate way  in order to 
make concrete progress. There after, two principle choices exist with respect to follow-
up: 
action by industry in line with such a common view of the EU regulators and 
Member States; 
the  adoption  of legislation  at  Community  level  providing  for  clear  rules 
regarding  cross-border  transmission  tarification  that  must  be  followed  by  each 
Transmission System Operator. 
These· choices  are  not  mutually  exclusive:  Community  legislation  might  be  adopted 
which  could  take  into  account  interesting  developments  by  ETSOA  and  national 
regulatory authorities. 
No conclusion has as yet been made by the Commission on this issue.  It will decide 
how to proceed in the light of comments received following publication of this report, 
notably  from  Council  and the  European Parliament.  However,  the  Commission  will 
actively  continue  work  on this  area  to  ensure  that  it  is  in  a  position,  if and  when 
necessary to propose legislative measures to the Council and the European Parliament. 
.  3. Need for a common commercial policy towards third countries 
3.1. Introduction 
At the 4th  meeting of the follow-up up group for the implementation of the electricity 
directive on 20 November 1998 the Commission has presented a detailed analysis of 
this issue. This chapter follows up the main findings. 
With regard to market structure, only a few years ago, the grid system of UCPTE was 
physically separated from Central and Eastern Europe grids, and trade could only take 
place marginally via a few special DC (direct current) network links and only  betwe~n 
monopolists.  In that situation, no  specific electricity trade rules  were  necessary,  and 
indeed, no specific rules for electricity imports and exports exist on Community level. 
This  issue  could  not  be  addressed  within  the  electricity  directive  96/92,  inter  alia 
21 because  the  directive  is  legally  based  on Article  1  00a. 15  The  prior transit directive 
lJU/54 7 and the Energy Charter stay within the concept of  transit between monopolists. 
ln tht! last years two fundamentals have changed. First, on the legal level, the electricity 
directive  breaks  up  the  monopoly  supply areas  and  forces  the  network operators to 
transport electricity purchased from  third party suppliers to customers in "their own" 
area. Second, on the technical and business level, the network operators have gradually 
developed links and extended the UCPTE grid system to non-EU member states. Thus, 
on the basis of legal and technical developments, electricity trade with third countries 
will no longer be a marginal phenomenon, but a real and significant opportunity. 
As a consequence, it appears possible that producers outside the EU, if  they are GATT 
members (or have ratified the Energy Charter), m~ght endeavour to claim free access to 
all  eligible customers in the  EU  whilst  having the  possibility to  maintain monopoly 
rights in their domestic territories, .thus, de facto,  preventin~ any trade in the opposite 
direction. 
However, at present, the legal possibilitY of non-EU companies to claim access to the 
eligible customers in the EU is unclear. Significant arguments exist for and against the 
possibility, pursuant to GATT, for Member States to refuse imports from third countries 
on grounds of reciprocity. Indeed, in certain Member States, provision for such refusal 
exists in national law.t6 The reasons for the introduction of this possibility for refusal 
are as follows: 
the  fundamental  contradiction would  result  that a more  restrictive  trading regime 
would exist for EU companies compared to non-EU undertakings; 
- the reason why the "reciprocity" clause has been introduced in  the Directive is to 
permit  Member  States  to  liberalise  most  or all  of domestic  customers,  without 
exppsure  to  unfair  competition.  As  a  consequence,  many  Member  States  are 
committed  to  go  further  than  the  25  %  minimum17.  If "unfair'~ trade  develops 
significantly with third countries, this trend may be stopped, or even reversed; 
- in  certain  countries  outside  the  EU,  planning  constraints  are  looser,  and 
environmental standards and social obligations are less stringent that the minimum 
EU  requirements.  Nonetheless,  electricity  supply  from  such  countries  is 
economically possible. A tendency may exist, particularly for non-EU firms, to take 
1  s When the Commission explained in 1988 the necessity of  directives for common rules for the 
electricity and gas markets in the Working Paper "The Internal Energy Market", COM (88)238 final, the 
issue of  external trade had already been raised: "In the; energy sphere, the Community should therefore 
'adopt a common external and commercial policy to enable it, where necessary, to obtain reciprocal 
concessions from its partners, on the Jines ofthe Uruguay Round. This notion of  reciprocity is essential." 
16 The Commission presented to Member States at the 4th follow up group for the implementation of  the 
electricity directive on 20.11.1998 an analysis of  the legal cqntext and the economic relevance of  imports 
from third countries: E.g. the transport capacity of  the existing interconnectors to non-EU countries could 
allow imports up to 70% of  domestic generation capacity in the case of Austria, 48% in the case of 
Greece, 17% in the case of  Germany, and approx.  I  0% in the case of  Sweden, Finland and Denmark. 
17 Germany I  00 %, Sweden 100 %, Finland 100 %, United Kingdom  I  00 %, Austria 50 %, The 
Netherlands 100 %, Spain 1  00 %, the remainder to be decided. 
22 advantage of these circumstances to  build  generating  capacity  outside  the  EU  to 
supply eligible clients in the EU; 
- if neighbouring  countries  wishing  to  access  the  EU  market  would  be  obliged  to 
themselves liberalise, this could have a number of benefits, notably environmental 
benefits as old generating capacity is more rapidly replaced by cleaner, more efficient 
new  generation  facilities,  and  improved  domestic  competitiveness  in  our 
neighbouring countries; 
3.2. Suggested approach 
. 
It appears necessary that the market opening, as required by the electricity directive, 
creates a level playing field based on commonly respected rules and standards. In this 
light, the directive provides (i) pursuant to article 3 the principle of equivalent market 
opening, (ii) pursuant to article  19(5) the possibility of reciprocity between Member 
States  and  (iii)  pursuant  to  artjcle  25  the obligation  for  the  Commission  to  report 
additional}¥  on  harmonisation  requirements.  If the  principle  of equivalent  market 
opening and reciprocity is accepted between the Member States themselves, it appears 
logical to equally apply it to third countries that wish to participate in and benefit from 
the internal electricity market. Such a reciprocity based approach should be discussed on 
three levels: 
(1)  equivalent quantitative market opening percentages (concept of  article 19(5) of  the 
Direciive) 
(2)  equivalent qualitative market access conditions relating to unbundling, transmission 
fees, grounds for refusal of  access, dispute settlement (concept of  equivalent market 
opening in article 3(1) of  the electricity directive) 
(3)  equivalent environmental standards in electricity production would be a further step 
to achieve a level playing field and to prevent unfair competition. As GATIIWTO 
rules  do  clearly  not  authorise  import  restrictions  based  on  "environmental 
dumping",  this  level  of reciprocity  could  only  be  achieved  through  bilateral 
agreements. 
As mentioned above,  it is unclear whether GATT rules  allow any  reciprocity based 
approach. If Member States take recourse on exception clauses (GATT Articles XX, 
XXIV,  Article  36 of the EU Treaty,  Electricity Directive Article 3),  a complex and 
uncertain legal situation would evolve. In order to avoid such legal uncertainty, bilateral 
agreements or understandings could be concluded between the EU and third countries 
enabling the establishment of  a reciprocity-based framework ensuring equivalent market 
opening and a level playing field. 
Such an approach based on bilateral understandings on the basis of reciprocity would 
create advantages for both the EU and third countries: 
•  It would  promote  a  faster  market  opening  in  those  third  countries,  which  are 
interested  in  a  full  market  integration.  For  accession  candidates  and  Europe 
23 Agreement  countries,  this  would  promote  the  taking  over  of  the  acquis 
communitaire. 
•  For those thir<lcountries that consequently will benefit from a legally certain supply 
opportunity in the EU electricity market, long tenn planning and financing will be 
facilitated.  This will allow new fmancing opportunities such as discounting power 
purchase agreements. 
•  This will  create  new investment opportunities,  thereby  contributing  to· increased 
economic growth and employment. 
•  This  will  promote  the  process  of modernisation,  efficiency  increase  and  C02 
reduction in CEEC and other third countries. 
•  Finally, it will  help to prepare the ground for a  consistent environmental policy, 
opening possibilities for new instruments in the context of the Kyoto commitments 
and the intemalisation of  external costs. 
It has to be noted that the opening of  any eventual negotiations with third states can only 
be made within the framework of a Council mandate on the basis of the procedure of 
article  228  of the  Treaty.  At this  stage,  the  Commission has  not yet  reached  any 
conclusion as to whether such a mandate should be requested from the Council. In the 
light of the reactions it receives following the publication of this report, in particular 
from the Council and the European Parliament, the Commission will detennine how to 
procede. III. Regulation of  the Electricity network at the European level 
1.  Introduction 
Each Transmission System Operator (TSO) is responsible for an essential service that is, 
in many respects, a perfect monopoly.  In terms of regulation this raises three essential 
issues:  (i)  possible  discrimination  by  a vertically-integrated  TSO  in  terms of access 
prices and conditions to the network for  competitors,  (ii) excessive pricing,  and  (iii) 
taking all reasonable steps to meet demand from customers via network reinforcement. 
Many of these issues can and should be dealt with at the national level.  Indeed, in this 
respect Article 22 of the directive requires Member states to  "create appropriate and 
efficient mechanisms for regulation, control and transparency so as to avoid any abuse 
of  dominant position .... ". 
2.  The existing role of  the Commission 
However, a number of  issues arising in this respect require an active role to be taken at 
the European level: 
The regulation of TSOs is both difficult, and, for many Member States, a new 
challenge.  The Commission plays an important role in ensuring the active exchange of 
information,  experience  and  expertise  between  national  regulators  and  competition 
authorities.  Equally, in order to favour the creation of a true common market, ideally 
the same regulatory test and standards should be applied throughout the Community. 
Whilst it is not appropriate to propose the harmonisation of  regulatory approaches at the 
national  level,  an  active  policy  of convergence  through  benchmarking  is  clearly 
appropriate.  These objectives are pursued notably via the organisation of the bi-annual 
meeting  of EU  electricity  regulatory  forum  in  Florence.  The  Commission  should 
continue to play this facilitating role. 
Whilst Article 20(  4) provides that  "in the event of  cross-border disputes,  the 
dispute  settlement authority shall be  the  dispute  settlement authority concerning the 
system of  the single buyer or the system operation which refuses use of, or access to,  the 
system " in many cases it will be the competition rules of  the EU Treaty that are applied 
in such cases. 
Moreover,  in  cases  of submarine  interconnectors,  the  responsibility  of both 
involved  national  regulators  could  be  insufficient  in  order  to  provide  for  effective 
regulation of access  tarification,  capacity reservation  and  refusal  of access.  In  such 
cases, EC law would necessarily have to be directly applied. 
Whilst, in principle, disputes at national level in terms of  network access should 
be resolved by national regulatory or competition authorities, the EU competition rules 
are applicable to  such cases in the event that an appreciable effect on trade between 
Member States results.  Where  complaints are received  by  the  Commission  in  such 
cases, close co-ordination between the Commission and national authorities is vital. 
25 At present the inter-action between Commission and Member State competition policies 
is working effectively. No significant need for harmonisation measures has, therefore, 
been identified. 
3.  Cross-border transmission tarifieation 
However,  with  respect  to  cross-border  transmission  tarification  systems  and  trade-
related mechanisms, neither national regulatory action, nor Community action under the 
competition rules, is fully able to address the issues concerned. As discussed above, the 
Commission is presently examining the different options available for the establishment 
of a single EU-wide cross-border tarification methodology.  Such an issue can not be 
dealt with properly at national level, because it is not possible· for any potential single 
EU tarification mechanism, or indeed in due course the actual tarification levels, to be 
'regulated by 15 different authorities, each with possibly conflicting views. 
EU competition policy, which in any event does not prevent contemporaneous national 
regulation, is also limited in terms of both procedure and remedies in relation to such 
issues.  The reason for this flows notably from  the fact that, as mentioned above, the 
TSO owns a perfect monopoly.  It is becoming increasingly recognised that, in these 
circumstances,  the  prices  and  conditions  charged  by  a  TSO  must  be  fixed  by  a 
regulatory authority, and cannot  simply be  left to the TSO  itself,  subject to ex-post 
control by a competition authority.  A competition authority can only,  for  example, 
prohibit excessive pricing once this has been proven through a judicial or administrative 
procedure.  A competition authority cannot, therefore, require, ex-ante, a TSO to pass 
possible  efficiencies  on  to  consumers  through  lower  prices.  For  these  reasons, 
transmission prices are set by regulatory authorities in all EU countries save Germany 
which, alone, relies on the competition authority to act as a price limiting mechanism. 
This same issue, therefore, arises at EU level: "which authority is going to regulate the 
mechanisms and, more importantly, in coming years, the actual prices charged by the 
European TSO's in terms of cross-border tarification  ?".  It  is  worth noting  in  this 
respect that the importance of  such tarification will gain in coming years as cross-border 
transactions increase in number.  In reacting a conclusion on this issue, the following 
questions need to be answered: 
- Whilst,  in  theory,  each  national  regulatory/competition  authority  might  have 
jurisdiction to deal  with cross-border tarification  issues  insofar as  they  concern 
imports and, possibly  exports, is it acceptable to have  15  potentially conflicting 
decision-making processes contemporaneously treating this issue?  Would such an 
apprpach  not  frustrate  the  objective  of having  one  single  EU-wide  tarification 
system for the whole EU ? 
- Is it possible to rely  at Community level simply on EU  competition rules to 
resolve this issue despite the fact that (i) almost all jurisdictions world-wide now 
accept that competition policy is an inadequate instrument to regulate transmission 
tariffs and (ii) the application of  the competition rules does not exclude the potential 
conflict and multi-disciplinary issues outlined above ? 
26 In order to deal with this issue, two possible approaches appear to exist: 
Through some mechanism, such as the EU Electricity Regulation Forum, co-
ordinated by the Commission, endeavour to reach consensus between EU regulators and 
the European Commission which, at present, can only act pursuant to the competition 
rules  on the  approach  to  take  regarding  cross-border  tarification  methodology  and 
levels. 
Envisage some form of new regulatory instrument to be administrated by the 
Commission, or via the establishment of  a "European Regulator". 
Both of these approaches have advantages and disadvantages.  The first approach has 
the  advantage  that  it  requires  no new institutions,  treaties,  or rules.  However,  in 
substance, it has the drawback that it lacks exactly such formal rules - it relies on the 
unanimous consensus of  all 15 Member State regulatory authorities, and, at least at EU 
level,  lacks  legal  authority  to  impose  ex-ante  decided  cross-border  tariffs.  In this 
respect, therefore it requires de-facto agreement, by industry, to respect conclusions 
reached through this method.  Equally, any decisions might only  be taken once all 
partiestB had agreed, making it difficult to envisage how rapid decisions might be made. 
The latter approach has the main disadvantage of requiring at least a new regulatory 
iJ,tStrument at Community level.  Its clear advantage, however, is to create, at European 
level, a regulatory instrument equivalent to that which has been, or is in the process of 
being, established in almost every single EU Member State. 
The  Commission  has  reached  no  conclusion  at  present  as  to  the  appropriate  way 
forward.  The  purpose of the  Harmonisation  Report  on this  issue,  therefore,  is  to 
commence  debate  and,  in  particular,  to  solicit  the  views  of the  Council  and  the 
European Parliament. 
18 15 Member States plus the Commission 
27 IV. Ensuring a level playinc field in the European electricity market 
The third part of this report examines possible distortions of competition within the 
internal market as a result of diverging legal  standards, mainly affecting the cost of 
electricity generation. 
It is evident that there are various factors and circumstantial conditions which will lead 
to different costs ofelectricity production in the different Member States. Many of  these 
factors are of structural, historical-nature or represent political choices of  the Member 
States. It cannot be the intention of  this report to suggest harmonisation of  such general 
factors. 
Moreover, the rules of  the EC Treaty, in particular those concerning competition, are an 
, adequate framework to address many market distortions in the electricity sector after 
liberalisation. However, some specific and complex areas might deserve not only a case 
by case approach, but also a more general discussion.  This chapter focuses  on three 
specific  areas,  which  have  been  recognised  to  influence  the  cost  of electricity 
production.  First,  environmental  standards,  second,  accounting  standards for  nuclear 
decommissioning and,  third,  taxation  with  respect  to  energy  products  as  well  as to 
corporate tax schemes which specifically benefit electricity companies. Evidently, this 
selection of  issues is not exhaustive. 
1. Environmental standards in electricity production 
1.1. Introduction 
Environmental  standards,  mainly  those  focussing  on  air  pollution,  are  able  to 
substantially influence the choice of generation technology and the cost of electricity 
generation. This chapter discusses the existing secondary EU legislation as well as the 
new developments. As environmental standards are already covered by EU legislation 
the need for  further or accelerated harmonisation steps in the  light of the liberalised 
internal  electricity  market ·  are  to  be  discussed  in  the  context  of EU  environmental 
policy. 
1.2. Existing Legislation 
There are three main directives dealing with large combustion plants. 
1.  The Directive on Combating Air Pollution from  Industrial Installations of 1984 
(Directive 84/360) established the first European framework for dealing with air 
pollutant emissions from industrial plants, and introduced a number of  important 
principles, such as: 
- prior  authorisation  of construction  or  substantial  modification  of industrial 
processes; 
28 - use of  Best Available Technologies Not Entailing Excessive Cost (BA lNEEC). 
This  Directive  will  be  repealed  on 30 October 2007 and  replaced  by  Council 
Directive 96/61/EC  (see below).  The development of best available  techniques 
could be an important tool for meeting Kyoto emission reduction targets. 
2.  The  Directive  on  controlling  of Emissions  from  Large  Combustion  Plants 
(LCPD), 1988, is a "daughter" directive to Directive 84/360 and sets out emission 
standards for particulates, S02 and NOx, and emission ceilings for S02 and NOx. 
A key feature of  this Directive is the setting of  emission standards for new plants 
larger than 50 MWt, irrespective of the fuel  used.  A number of derogations are 
permitted for plants operating for less than 2200 hours per year, for power plants 
in Spain and for indigenous lignite fired power plants. Emission standards for new 
plants are also  applicabl~ to plants extended by at least 50 MWt. The LCPD did 
not contain S02 emission standards for new coal-fired plants between 50 and 100 
MWt - a  1994  amendment to the  LCPD  introduced an emission limit of 2000 
mglm
3
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The Directive also set targets (known as "emission ceilings") for the reduction of 
total  national  emissions of S02  and NOx  from  existing  plants,  based  on  1980 
emissions. These targets extend to 2003. A standard percentage reduction was set 
for most countries.  Certain Member States were  allowed derogations from  this 
requirement to take account of reductions achieved before  1980 or their state of 
economic development. The ceilings and corresponding percentage reductions are 
set out in the Directive. 
3.  Council Directive 96/61/EC of September 1996 concerning Integrated Pollution 
Prevention  and  Control  (IPPC)  requires  the  introduction  of  an  integrated 
environmental licensing system, which will apply to a range of industrial process, 
including  power  stations  larger  than  50  MWt.  This  must  be  implemented  in 
Member States by 30 October 1999. The regime must be applied to all new plant 
and substantial changes to existing plant and must be extended to all existing plant 
by 2007 at the latest. The competent authorities in each country must ensure that 
all  appropriate  preventive  measures  are  taken  against  pollution,  in  particular 
through  application  of the  best  available  techniques.  For  a  technique  to  be 
considered "available" according to the definition of "best available techniques" 
provided  in  the  Directive,  it  must  be  developed  on  a  scale  allowing 
implementation  in  the  relevant  industrial  sector  under  technically  and 
economically  viable  conditions,  taking  into  consideration  the  costs  and  the 
advantages. The best available techniques for each industry will not be prescribed 
but will  be  assessed  by  the  competent  authorities,  based  on  site  - and  plant-
specific factors. 
Permits  must  specify  emission  limit  values  for  releases  to  air  and  water  and 
include, where necessary, appropriate measures ensuring protection of  the soil and 
ground water and measures regarding the management of waste generated by the 
installation.  Emission  limit  values  should  take  into  account  the  potential  to 
transfer pollution from  one medium  to  another and  must be based on the  best 
29 available techniques,  wi1}lout  prescribing the  use  of any  technique  or specific 
technology. but  ·taking into account the teclmical characteristics of  the installation 
concerned, its geographical location and the local environmental conditions. 
The Directive also sets as a general principle that necessary measures are· taken 
upon decommissioning to avoid any pollution risk and return the site of  operation 
to a  satisfactory state.  Competent authorities must take this into account when 
det~rmining  permi~  conditions. 
1.3. New Developments 
The following developments will affect pollution control for power plants in the EC. 
Air Quality 
There is now a common position (No 57  /98) on the first  daughter Directive on 
ambient  air  quality  under  the  1996  Framework  Directive  (96/62/EC  of 27 
September 1996) which proposes stringent new national caps for 802 and NOx and 
particulates and lead. 
These are based on critical loads analysis and the draft strategy aims to achieve by 
2010 a 50% closure of  the gap between the critical load and the level of  ecosystem 
protection in· 1990. This strategy is now set out in a Common position (57/98), 
adopted by the Council, that establishes limit values, margins of tolerance and in 
the case of  802 alert thresholds, for 802, and NO"· particulates and lead. 
Acidification 
There is now a common position (61/98) that aims to reduce 802 emissions across 
the  EC  by  placing  restrictions  on  the  sulphur  contents  of certain  liquid  fuel 
products (heavy fuels oils and gas oils) used in power stations and industry. There 
are  possibilities  for  derogations  to  this  Directive  for  regions  where  air quality 
objective are respected and where emission of 802 do not contribute significantly 
to  exceedance  of critical  loads  of acidification.  This  impacts  on power  plants 
burning heavy fuels oil and gas ~il. 
Revision of  LCP  D 
A third development is the revision of  the Large Combustion Plants Directive - 88 
/609/EEC. The central elements of  this proposal are 
•  updating of emission limit values for combustion plants coming into operation 
after 2000 
•  extension of  the scope to gas turbines 
•  updating  of the  scope of fuels  covered by  clarifying  relationship  with waste 
incineration Directives and encouraging use of  biomass 
•  promotion of  combined heat and power 
•  updating of  provisions concerning abnormal operating conditions 
30 •  reinforced  monitoring ·requirements·  and  updating  provisions  on.  emission 
inventories 
Water 
Power. stations normally require large quantities of water to  functiOn.  The IPPC 
Directive will deal  in an integrated way  with emission to· air, soil and to water. 
However,  in addition to this Directive, a  Commission proposal for  a framework 
Directive  on water  (COM  (97)  49 as  amended  by  COM  (97)  614)  would  set 
standards  and  the  mechanisms  for  ensuring  that  limit  values  under  the  IPPC 
Directive are observed. This would also apply to power plants. 
Waste 
Waste from  power station (mainly from coal fired  plant) will be covered by the 
IPPC Directive and will be covered by the EC's existing legislation on waste. 
Kyoto Protocol 
Under the Kyoto Protocol the EC and its Member States are committed to reducing 
greenhouse gases (ghg) emissions by 8% by 2008-2012 in relation to 1990 levels. 
The power sector is a major and growing source of emissions in the Community 
accounting for around 30% of EU C02 emissions. It is not clear at this stage to 
what extent the constraint on ghg emissions could influence trade in electricity. 
There are many scenarios which demonstrate that electricity trade could help to 
meet Kyoto targets by for instance optimising electricity generation at the regional 
level, flattening of  the load curve which could take inefficient peaking plants out of 
service and increasing the potential for intermittent renewables. On the other hand it 
may well be that some Member States that have power sectors with different C02 
intensities may, in the present policy framework, face problems in reconciling both 
trade  and  environmental  objectives  related  to  Kyoto.  The  best  known  case  is 
associated with the electricity trade between Denmark, Norway and Sweden that 
have very different electricity sectors 
1.4. Conclusion 
In the  light of the  above  it is clear that the  Commission is  actively  examining the 
measures that need to be taken at Community level to ensure equivalent competitive 
conditions as a result of  environmental requirements. It will continue to pursue this line, 
notably with respect to the adoption of  the revision of  the LCPD. Planned reductions in 
both traditional pollutants and in greenhouse gas emissions may indeed impact power 
generation in Member States. However, the differing energy structures, both in terms of 
technical choices and organisation, render a detailed analysis of impacts impossible at 
this stage. 
2. Standards for nuclear decommissioning 
31 2.1. Introduction 
The issue of  decommissioning or dismantling of  nuclear power plants is included in this 
report because of  the specific effects relating to the different financing and accounting 
approaches.  It is  not intended to  question the  different organisational  and  technical 
approaches towards decommissioning. 
The main costs of nuclear power generation include capital investment, fuel, ongoing 
generation and maintenance costs, plus, and this is the main difference to other types of 
generation,  the  costs for  nuclear waste. storage  and  future  dismantling  costs.19  It  is 
evident that the evaluation of these latter costs is rather complex. Depending on the 
valuation of these cost factors and the legal obligation to calculate provisions into the 
electricity prices, the resulting prices ·of nuclear sources have considerable bandwidth. 
Regarding liquidity, thus looking at generators from a cash flow perspective, the timing 
of the payments related  to the costs  is  significantly  different  for  nuclear electricity 
generation compared with other types of generation. A nuclear power generator has to 
make provisions for  substantial  fi,lture  payments, namely the costs of nuclear waste 
storage and dismantling. With regard to its future  financial obligations, the generator 
itself or a separate entity will seek to invest the cash surplus which is collected through 
provisions or other levies. 
Thus,  nuclear  generators  can  be  seen  as  trustees  for  funds  to  cover  future 
decommissioning costs. Since electricity generators have to compete with each other as 
of  19  February  1999,  diverging  regulatory  approaches  to  the  management  of 
decommissioning funds may cause substantial market distortions. 
2.2. Current decommissioning approaches 
There is no specific EC legislation on the decommissioning of  power plants. However, 
as  regards  power plants that  would  be covered under the  IPPC  Directive,  eventual 
decommissioning would  need to  be  taken  into  account when authorisation  is  being 
sought. 
With the exception of Directive 96/29 EURATOM laying down basic safety standards 
for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers 
arising  from  ionising  radiation,  and  Directive  85/337/EEC  amended  by  Directive 
97/11/EC on the assessment of the effect of certain public and private projects on the 
environment, there is no specific EC legislation on the decommissioning of nuclear 
power plants. 
A close overview of  the age of Europe's nuclear facilities reveals that the first years of 
the next century will see a rapid increase in the number of such facilities reaching the 
end  .of  their lifetime. 
l9 This chapter focuses on decommissioning costs because of  the diverging accounting and financing 
methods. Costs associated with waste storage related to the current operation of  the plant are in that sense 
similar to pollution generated by other forms of  power generation. 
32 In  the  European  Union,  nuclear  decommissioning  techniques  have  been  under 
development for two decades and are becoming a mature technology. For a few reactors, 
decommissioning  activities  are  currently  on  going  and  will  contribute  in  the 
development of  a fully mature industrial activity. 
The development of common views within the EU on. the decommissioning of these 
facilities-should result in a better protection of the population and of the environment, 
and in a more standardised technological practice allowing e.g.: a reduction of  the waste 
volumes and the decommissioning costs. 
The  outcome  from  fUl  EC  consultation2o  indicates  that  there  are  differences  in  the 
approach to decommissioning by Member States. Iri some areas, there is a potential for 
improvement and harmonisation at the European Union level. Therefore, with the aim 
of European  co-operation,  harmonisation  of policies,  and  development  of common 
views,  as emphasised by the opening and the  deregulation of the electricity  market 
within the Member States, it would be a significant benefit to have Community common 
approaches for the decommissioning of  nuclear facilities. 
The electricity directive 96/92/EC opens for the first time competition in the European 
~lectricity market, not only at the production level, but also at the supply level. The need 
for transparency in the electricity-producing companies' accounts foresees a clear need 
for a full integration of  the end of  life decommissioning costs. 
Different  situations  exist  among  the  Member  States  for  the  financing  of 
decommissioning,  e.g.  simple provision in the accounts of the  electricity companies 
allowing reinvestment of the collected funds for other than decommissioning purposes, 
segregation of collected funds outside the sphere of the company, or a complete State 
organisation  and  management  of decommissioning  by  separate  specialised,  mostly 
publicly owned companies. 
Moreover, the amount of  yearly funding required, the requirements as to when and how 
decommissioning  has  to  be  accomplished  and  the  applied  calculation  methods  and 
discount rates differ substantially between Member States. This situation questions the 
principles quoted above and could lead to distortion and discrimination between the new 
competing nuclear electricity producers from different Member States. 
Decommissioning costs are clearly seen as part of  the electricity production costs. They 
may not be cross-subsidised from the transmission activity nor be directly subsidised via 
state aid to the extent that they are incompatible with the EU Treaty. 
Provided that financial provisions have been built up throughout the operating life of a 
nuclear facility, the costs per kWh should be relatively low and should not significantly 
influence electricity charges or lead to unfair competition between producers. 
20 EUR Report 18.860 (1999) Nuclear Safety and  the Environment: Decommissioning of  nuclear 
installations in the EU. 
33 The steps to be  taken in determining financing  requirements include  identifying the 
decommissioning  strategy  to  be  applied  and  preparing  detailed  costs  estimates that 
include appropriate risk margins. Sound decommissioning financing ·will also increase 
the public acceptance of the potential legacy to the future generations. The benefit of 
this approach is to ensure that money is available when immediate decommissioning  · 
occurs,  and that financial  burdens and risks  are  not imposed on future  generations 
should any. decommissioning activities be 4eferred to a later date. 
If  needed, the estimated funds should take into account stated plans for reusing some of 
the existing installations for new nuclear purposes. 
If  appropriate financial provisions have not been built up over time, there is a potential 
risk that producers could choose to elect the cheapest decommissioning strategy rather 
than  make  a  balanced  judgement  on  all  the  relevant  factors,  e.g.  safety  and 
environmental issues. 
2.3. Suggested approach 
The Commission services believe 
•  that the Member States should apply transparency of the financing plans and of its 
calculation method, that the required full amount of  the fund/provision be identified, 
including the complete decommissioning process the waste management and final 
disposal costs, 
•  that these full  decommissioning costs be included in the selling price of the kWh· 
(internalisation of costs) with the potential exception of historical nuclear liabilities 
associated, for example, with national research or defence facilities for which clear 
specific financial arrangements should be taken at national levels, 
•  that  the  fund/provision  be  secured  and  controlled  by  the  mandated  nati_onal 
autho~ties, 
•  that the fund/provision be dedicated to decommissioning purposes, and nothing else, 
•  and that the full  funding be available at the foreseen time (fixed in licence) of the 
final shutdown of  the facility. 
It has to be emphasised that most of these principles can be derived either from the 
unbundling requirements of  the electricity directive or from the competition rules of  the 
EC  Treaty.  Nevertheless,  due  to  the  specific  aspects  of decommissioning  and  the 
importance for the level playing field in the European electricity market, a harmonised 
approach could be beneficial. In this context, the role of  the Euratom treaty needs to be 
taken into account. 
3. Taxation 
3.1. Indirect taxation 
34 1.  There are 2 systems of indirect taxation which apply to electricity. The first is VAT 
which  is  largely  harmonised  at Community  level,  and  the  second  is  a  series  of 
national single stage taxes which currently are not regulated at Community level. 
2. · According  to  the  general  provisions of the  sixth  VAT  Directive  of the  Council 
(n° 77/388/EC of 17  May  1977), the  standard VAT rate  applies to electricity.  In 
practice, the level of the standard rate varies between 1  5% and 25%. Nevertheless, 
according to Article 12(3 )(b) of  the same text, Member States may apply a reduced 
rate of  no less than 5% to supplies of  electricity provided that no. risk of  distortion of 
competition exists. It is the Commission that takes a decision on the existence of  this 
risk and allows for the derogation. Greece applies the reduced rate to electricity on 
that basis since t••;anuary 1999. 
Moreover, current Community law does not allow the application of different VAT 
rates to electricity, -depending on the means of  production such as "green electricity". 
The  sixth  directive  lays  down  a  fundamental  principle that  cannot  be  infringed, 
according to which a single rate applies to a product. Thus, it is not evident, under 
current l~gislation, to make a distinction according to the way in which the electricity 
is produced. 
3.  In  its  proposal  for  a  Directive  restructuring  the  Community  framework  for  the 
taxation of energy  products  (COM(97)30)  the  Commission  is  proposing  that the 
scope of taxation hatmonised at Community level shall be extended from mineral 
oils to cover other competing sources of  energy namely; coal, coke, lignite, bitumens 
and  products  derived  from  them,  natural  gas  and  electricity.  The  scope  of the 
proposal is to improve the functioning of  the internal market whilst at the same time 
offering  Member  States  the  possibility  to  better  attain  national  objectives  of 
employment, environment, transport and energy policy. 
The Commission has proposed that electricity shall be taxed at the level of output. 
When electricity is traded between Member States this principle means taxation in 
the  country  where  the electricity is  finally  consumed and  accordingly,  electricity 
could be traded without tax. The currently proposed system of  taxing output does not 
however provide for differentiation on the basis of the quality of fuel  used but it 
allows Member States to differentiate levels of  taxation on the basis of  type of  user 
(e.g. industry-household). 
However,  in  the  light  of a  possible  certification  system  for.  renewable  based 
electricity  producers  - an  option  discussed  within  the  framework  of promotion 
schemes for renewables - a. differentiated taxing of electricity from  such certified 
renewable based generators could be possible. 
Nevertheless,  under the proposal (COM(97)30) Member States that wish can,  for 
environmental purposes, apply additional taxation to inputs.  In order to encourage 
their development the Commission proposes that Member States be authorised to 
refund to the producer of electricity from renewable sources all or a part of the tax 
paid. Any such approach has to be in line with the state aid rules of  the EC Treaty. A  Member  State  taxing  inputs  may  not  discriminate  imported  electricity.  If a 
determination of  the input factors for the foreign produced electricity is not possible 
(which  is indeed  difficult  without harmonised  certification system)  the  importing 
Member  State  would  only  be  able  to  tax  imported  electricity  at  the  lowest  rate 
applicable to domestic production following the recent Judgement of the European 
Court of Justice  in  the  case of Outokumpu Oy v Finnish  Customs  (Case  no  C-
213/96). 
Although the new proposal does not provide for completely harmonised tax rates it is 
hoped that a combination of a steady increase in minimum rates and the fact that 
maximum rates  will  be  constrained  by  concerns of competitivity will  result in  a 
closer approximation of rates over a period of time. The Commission has proposed 
minimum levels of  taxation of 1 ECU per MWh rising to 3 ECU per MWh in 2002. 
3.1. Direct taxation 
In the  field  of corporation  tax  there  is  no  harmonisation  of tax  bases  on which 
corporation tax is levied. In this context, it does not appear appropriate to propose a 
harmonisation of  tax bases only for electricity companies. However, already today, a 
potential problem exists from  a state aid point of view if a specific exemption of 
direct tax is applied only for public or national companies. This problem has already 
been taken up by the Commission. By letter of 6 March 1998 Member States have 
been asked to inform the Commission about the existence of  tax arrangements which 
derogate from the ordinary rules as far as electricity undertakings arc concerned. The 
replies have been preliminarily studied, and in some cases further investigation will 
be  necessary.  Due  to  the  complexity of the  specific  tax  systems  in the  Member 
States, no overall conclusions can be presented at this stage. 
3.3. Conelusion with respect to Taxation 
In this light of the above,  it appears that the issues relating to taxation are  presently 
being  actively  dealt  with  by  the  Commission.  Work  regarding  direct  taxation  will 
continue, and the Council is encouraged to seek rapid agreement on the draft Directive 
restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of  energy products. 
38 Annex: Definitions 
~Offsetting  or superimposing counterdirected  flows': If  over an electricity line between. 
A and B one contract is concluded to transport e.g. 100 MW in direction A and a second 
contract over the same time is concluded to transport e.g. 80 MW in direction B, than 
only 20 MW have to  be physically transported in direction A.  Thus,  counterdirected 
contractual flows can be superimposed in order to cancel each other out. Consequently, 
the contractual capacity of  an electricity line can be significantly higher than its physical 
capacity. 
'Disp~~tching of  generation': As the total capacity of power plants is,  unless during 
absolute peak hours, not necessary to cover electricity demand, some mechanism has to 
be set up to decide which power plant should operate and which plant should be idle or 
on stand by. The selection or drawdown of the power plants for  generation is called 
dispatching.  Usually,  it  is  the  independent  system operator that makes  this  decision 
according to objective and non discriminatory criteria (merit order). 
'Countertradlng':  If despite  superimposing  of counterdirected  flows  the  resulting 
physical flow reaches the capacity of  the transmission line, a situation of  congestion or 
bottleneck exists in the resulting direction.  Any  further contractual transaction in the 
congested direction can only be carried out, if  at the same time e.g. the system operator 
arranges a corresponding contractual flow in the opposite direction. To achieve this the 
system operator has to purchase or sell electricity from generators, or even consumers, 
that are willing to increase or decrease generation/consumption. 
'Redispatclring':  This  is  an  alternative  to  resolve  an  existing  bottleneck,  similar to 
'countertrading'. In case of 'redispatching' the system operators of  the concerned areas 
do not engage in offsetting trading contracts, but directly change the dispatching order 
ofthe.power plants to create overall electricity flows which remain within the limits of  - the transport line constraints. 
'Market  splitting':  This  is  another  alternative  to  deal  with  a  bottleneck,  usually 
applicable in systems which already have a common spotmarket. As a reaction to the 
occurrence of a congestion, the market operators provide for the possibility that there 
are different spotmarket prices on either side of  the bottleneck. Thus, electricity in the 
area which is oversupplied becomes· cheaper than electricity in the undersupplied area. 
Consequently less market participants are  interested to purchase from  the area which 
becomes more expensive and the resulting flow over the bottleneck is reduced. 
'Transaction  oriented  tariff':  Equivalent  to  'point-to-point  tariff',  this  method  of 
tarification calculates a transmission fee  on the basis of information about entry point 
('source') and exit point ('sink') of  the electricity contract. Thus, if  an eligible customer 
shifts  from  supplier  A  to  supplier  B,  the  parties  would  have  to  recalculate  the 
transmission fee depending on the location of  the new supplier. 
'Non transaction oriented tariff': Equivalent to  'point of connection tariff' or 'nodal 
tariff',  this  tarification  methodology  divides  the  overall  transmission  system  costs 
37 exclusively to separate connection fees (or network access fees) for the producer and the 
consumer.  Thus,  the  connection  fee  for  an  eligible  customer  remains  the  same, 
irrespective of  a change of  supplier. 
'Postage :stamp': This expression is used to describe a transmission or access fee which 
does not depend on the distance of  the transaction. Usually a postage stamp tariff would 
also  be  a  non  transaction  oriented  tariff.  Nevertheless,  additional  'transit'  postage 
stamps for specific situations are imaginable. 
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